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This Essay will seek to explain EU regulatory practice in relation to new technologies, prin-
cipally GMOs, and to show that the EU should be able to find an approach that meets public
concerns while remaining consistent with Article XX, paragraphs (b) and (g). This Essay will also
identify those areas where Article XX, in its present form, it likely to be a source of justified public
concern.
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INTRODUCTION
Article XX(b) of GATT 19941 recognizes that WTO Mem-
ber Countries ("Member Countries") may adopt measures neces-
sary to protect human, animal, or plant life or health while Arti-
cle XX(g) recognizes that Member Countries may impose mea-
sures relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural
resources if such measures are made effective in conjunction
with restrictions on domestic production or consumption. Para-
graph (g) is important because, in the light of the Appellate
Body's Report in the Shrimp/Turtle dispute, 2 sea turtles can con-
stitute an exhaustible natural resource.3 This approach is poten-
tially extendible to other animal species, insects, and even
plants. Both paragraph (b) and paragraph (g) are subject to the
proviso set out in the chapeau to Article XX, namely that the
measures must not constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifi-
able discrimination between countries where the same condi-
tions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade.
The scope of these exceptions is narrow, and this narrowness has
been experienced recently by the EU in the EU Measures Concern-
* Stanbrook & Hooper, Brussels, Belgium.
1. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agree-
ment Establishing the World Trade Organization, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF
THE URUGUAY ROUND Vol. 1, 33 I.L.M. 1144 (1994) [hereinafter WTO Agreement], An-
nex 1A, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND Vol. 27, 33 I.L.M. 1125
(1994).
2. United States-Import Prohibitions of Certain Shrimps and Shrimp Products, Report of
the Panel, WT/DS58/R/Corr.1 (May 15, 1998). For a criticism of the Appellate Body's
extensive interpretation of Article XX(g), see Wisam Abboud, The WTO's Committee on
Trade and Environment: Reconciling GATT 1994 with Unilateral Trade-Related Environmental
Measures, EUR. ENVrL. L. REv. 147 (2000).
3. Although the Appellate Body found that the U.S. measures were applied in a
manner that created arbitrary and unjustifiable discrimination among Member Coun-
tries.
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ing Meat and Meat Products (Hormones)4 ("Beef Hormones Case").
The EU could be heading for a similar experience in relation to
genetically modified organisms ("GMOs"). Issues such as hor-
mones in beef, GMOs in food and BSE in cows fuel the debate
between consumer and environmental organizations on the one
hand and the proponents of free trade on the other. This de-
bate arises out of a growing conflict between scientific objectivity
and consumer mistrust of both scientists and politicians.'
Added to this is the question of the "ethical" choice of lifes-
tyle. Movements in favour of macrobiotic or "green" farming
have been premised on the argument that if food can be pro-
duced without spraying the environment with pesticides, herbi-
cides, fungicides, or synthetic fertilizer, and without injecting an-
imals with hormones, then in a rich civilized society we should
refrain from such practices. These idealistic arguments do not
always focus on the economic cost involved. For example, at the
beginning of the century an average household might spend up
to 80% of its budget on food, whereas today the proportion is
only 15%. The relative reduction in the cost of food has been
paid for by adopting production practices that are now called
into question by sections of the population.
As a result of macrobiotic, "organically grown" and "green"
movements, there exist food chains, and sections of supermar-
kets that deal exclusively in food produced under supervision by
private certification bodies. Thus the consumer has the free
choice of purchasing "standard" food or of possibly paying a
higher price in order to obtain food that is certified as having
4. See EU Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones)-Complaint by the
United States, Report of the Panel, WT/DS26/R/USA (Aug. 18, 1997); EU Measures Con-
cerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones)-Complaint by Canada, Report of the Panel,
WT/DS48/R/CAN (Aug. 18, 1997). All references in this Essay will be to EC Measures
Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones)-AB-1997-4, Report of the Appellate Body,
WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R (Jan. 5, 1998) [hereinafter Beef Hormones Case].
5. The recent report of Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers, to the British Minister of
Agriculture, on the measures taken to protect the public from Creutzfeld-Jakob disease,
a human version of bovine spongiform encephalitis ("BSE") transmitted to humans
through consumption of meat from infected animals found that the UK Ministry of
Agriculture and Fisheries did not lean in favour of agricultural producers to the detri-
ment of the consumer, and that the Government did not lie to the public about BSE.
Nevertheless there were certain shortcomings and delays in turning policy into practice,
and these have left an unfavourable image in the eyes of the British public. See UK
MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE, FISHERIES AND FOOD, THE BSE INQUIRY: THE REPORT (Oct.
2000), available at http://62.189.42.105/report.
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been produced in accordance with particular "green" standards.
This is a matter of free choice in a liberal society. It is also a
matter of economics as food producers have realized the market-
ing potential in being able to offer a "green" or "organically
grown" line of produce. Such freedom of choice is the driving
force of the global economy in the 21st century. Member Coun-
tries have the freedom to sell their produce in all other WTO
members' markets provided they comply with the requirements
of the importing country justified by Article XX of GATT 1994,
and, especially those that are necessary to protect human,
animal, or plant life or health. In certain circumstances, regula-
tions requiring labeling of contents can be justified under this
heading. A reasonable non-discriminatory labeling requirement
preserves both freedom of trade and freedom of consumer
choice.
The matter becomes more difficult when dealing with prod-
ucts that can be considered safe provided that they are used cor-
rectly, as in the case of the administration of hormones to beef
cattle. It is even more difficult when there is no possibility of
misuse and there is no scientific evidence that the consumption
of the product may involve a risk to health, as is the case for
certain GMOs. Looking into the future, the issue with some bio-
technologies will not be so much a question of human health,
but of respect for the ethical and moral positions taken by sec-
tions of the population.
Clearly, this is an area ripe for conflict in the WTO-free
trade arena. "Green" and "organic" farming are becoming issues
of international trade politics. It is a question of reconciling
avowed support for free trade, and all the economic benefits that
flow therefrom, with the domestic necessity of reassuring the
public that all precautions are being taken so as not to subject
them or the environment to any risk. In so doing, consumers
will be given the choice if they do not want to consume or use
certain types of products for ethical reasons.
This Essay will seek to explain EU regulatory practice in re-
lation to new technologies, principally GMOs, and to show that
the EU should be able to find an approach that meets public
concerns while remaining consistent with Article XX,
paragraphs (b) and (g). This Essay will also identify those areas




I. RECENT AMENDMENTS OF THE EC TREATY TO MEET
CONSUMER AND ENVIRONMEINTAL CONCERNS
The EU Member States have played to consumer concerns
by incorporating high-sounding principles into the founding
treaty of the EU, the Treaty of Rome setting up the European
Economic Community.6 In 1993 the EC Treaty was amended by
the Treaty of Maastricht to embody the objectives of "a high level
of human health,"' "a high level of consumer protection,"' and
"a high level of protection [of the environment]."' These princi-
ples were modified, effective May' 1, 1999, by the Treaty of Am-
sterdam. The principles of "a high level of human health," a
"high level of consumer protection" and a "high level of protec-
tion [of the environment]" are maintained, but the new wording
shows an evolution in policy. Whereas under the amendments
made by the Maastricht Treaty the emphasis was on the Commu-
nity encouraging co-operation among the Member States; the
new approach under the amendments made by the Amsterdam
Treaty is to make human health, consumer protection, and the
protection of the environment the primary objectives of Com-
munity action.1 0 Of the three dispositions, Article 174(2) EC is
significant because it states:
Community policy on the environment shall aim at a
high level of protection taking into account the diversity of
situations in the various regions of the Community. It shall
6. Treaty Establishing the European Community, Feb. 7, 1992, O.J. C 224/1
(1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 573 [hereinafter EC Treaty], incorporating changes made by
Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, O.J. C. 224/1 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 719
[hereinafter TEU]. The Treaty on European Union ("TEU") amended the Treaty es-
tablishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11 [here-
inafter EEC Treaty], as amended by Single European Act, O.J. L. 169/1 (1987), [1987] 2
C.M.L.R.741 [hereinafter SEA]. The Treaty establishing the European Community
("EC Treaty") was amended by the Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on Euro-
pean Union, the Treaties establishing the European Communities and certain related
acts, Oct. 2, 1997, OJ. C 340/1(1997) [hereinafter Treaty of Amsterdam]. These
amendments were incorporated into the EC Treaty, and the articles of the EC Treaty
were renumbered in the Consolidated version of the Treaty establishing the European
Community, OJ. C 340/3 (1997), 37 I.L.M. 79 [hereinafter Consolidated EC Treaty],
incorporating changes made by Treaty of Amsterdam, supra.
7. Id. art. 152.
8. Id. art. 153.
9. Id. art. 174(2).
10. For a detailed examination of the constitutional development of EU consumer
protection law, see Jules Stuyck, European Consumer Law After the Treaty of Amsterdam:
Consumer Policy In or Beyond the Internal Market? 37 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 367 (2000).
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be based on the precautionary principle and on the princi-
ples that preventive action should be taken, that environmen-
tal damage should as a priority be rectified at source and that
the polluter should pay.
t
"
Although the precautionary principle has not been incorporated
expressly into the EC Treaty's provisions on public health and
consumer protection, it has been invoked in these areas both by
private litigants and by EU Member States.
The "precautionary principle" referred to in Article 174(2)
is not defined in the EC Treaty. It is taken from principle 15 of
the Declaration of Rio, which states that "[i]n order to protect
the environment, the precautionary approach shall be widely ap-
plied by States according to their capabilities. Where there are
threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific
certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effec-
tive measures to prevent environmental degradation."' 2
The precautionary principle represents a significant devel-
opment in that it states that measures should be taken to control
activities that could potentially threaten the environment even if
there is lack of scientific certainty as to the true extent of any
environmental damage flowing from such activities. 13 The words
"lack of full scientific certainty" merit careful consideration. Ac-
cording to the natural sense of the words they do not mean "in
the absence of any scientific evidence at all" but that the scien-
tific evidence indicating that there is no risk to the environment
11. "EC" appearing after an Essay reference is the standard shorthand for refer-
ence to an article of the EC Treaty in its form as last amended by the Treaty of Amster-
dam.
12. United Nations Environment Programme, Rio Declaration On Environment And
Development (June 14, 1992), available at www.unep.org/Documents/Default.asp?Docu-
men tID=78&ArticleID=1 163. The precautionary principle has also been incorporated
into The United Nations Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diver-
sity, available at http://untreaty.un.org [hereinafter Convention on Biological Diver-
sity]. Article 11 (8) states: "Lack of scientific certainty due to insufficient relevant scien-
tific information and knowledge regarding the extent of the potential adverse effects of
a living modified organism on the conservation and sustainable use of biological diver-
sity in the Party of import, taking also into account risks to human health, shall not
prevent that Party from taking a decision, as appropriate, with regard to the import of
the living modified organism (intended for direct use as a food or feed, or for process-
ing), in order to avoid or minimise such potential adverse effects." Convention on
Biological Diversity, supra, at art. 11 (8).
13. See MAURICE SUNKIN ET AL., SOURCEBOOK ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAw 40, 50 (1998)
(commenting on Principle 7 of the Declaration of the U.N. Conference on the Human
Environment, Stockholm (1972) and on Principle 16 of the Rio Declaration).
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is incomplete or uncertain. Thus the precautionary principle
cannot be interpreted as requiring action just because there is a
popular belief that a particular activity will damage the environ-
ment irreversibly. As soon as there is reason to suspect that a
particular activity will harm the environment, it is necessary to
move the debate into the objective scientific field by carrying out
the necessary investigations so that any public debate on the is-
sue can be properly informed. If the scientific evidence shows
that there may be a risk, but the risk is not certain, precautionary
action should be taken.
II. THE NARROW SCOPE OF THE EXCEPTIONS IN ARTICLE
XX, PARAGRAPHS (B) AND (G), OF GATT 1994
The scope for Member Countries to adopt public health or
environmental protection measures that restrict free trade is lim-
ited by the prohibition on arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimina-
tion and disguised restrictions on trade contained in the cha-
peau to Article XX. In the case of measures to protect exhaus-
tible natural resources the measures must be made effective in
conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or con-
sumption. Unlike paragraph (b), there is no requirement in
paragraph (g) of Article XX that the restrictive measures be
''necessary" to achieve the objective of protecting exhaustible
natural resources, presumably because any measure' that limits
depletion of a natural resource is justified per se.
In the 'case of measures to protect'public health, on the
other hand, these must be strictly necessary for the objective pur-
sued. The "necessary" test does not authorize a Member Coun-
try to adopt a measure that is inconsistent with other GATT 1994
provisions if "an alternative measure that it could reasonably be
expected to employ and which is not inconsistent with other
GATT provisions is also available to it."14 This result is similar to
the proportionality test under EU law in deciding whether trade
restricting measures that are justified by "mandatory require-
ments" fall within the prohibition of Article 28 EC (formerly Ar-
ticle 30) or are justified by the public policy exception of Article
14. Thailand-Restrictions on Importation of and Internal Taxes on Cigarettes, DS1O/R
(Nov. 7, 1990). See generally Carlos M. Correa, Implementing National Public Health Policies
in the Framework of WITO Agreements, 34J. WORLD TRADE 89, 96 (2000).
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30 EC (formerly Article 36). Just as in the EU, the way forward
towards legal certainty is for the EU institutions to adopt direc-
tives harmonizing Member States' legislation, so too, in the
WTO, the way forward to certainty in the application of Article
XX is through specific agreements. This has been done in the
plant, animal, and human health area through the Uruguay
Round Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosani-
tary Measures16 ("SPS Agreement").
The SPS Agreement begins by reaffirming that:
[N]o Member should be prevented from adopting or enforc-
ing measures necessary to protect human, animal or plant life
or health, subject to the requirement that these measures are
not applied in a manner which would constitute a means of
arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between Members
where the same conditions prevail or a disguised restriction
on international trade."1 7 The purpose of the SPS Agree-
ment is to "harmonise sanitary and phytosanitary measures
between Members on the basis of international standards...
without requiring Members to change their appropriate level
of protection of human, animal or plant life or health." 8
Article 5.1 of the SPS Agreement requires that "[im]embers
shall ensure that their sanitary or phytosanitary measures are
based on an assessment, as appropriate to the circumstances, of
the risks to human, animal or plant life or health, taking into
account risk assessment techniques developed by the relevant in-
ternational organisations."19
This provision is designed to ensure that Member Countries
do not use sanitary or phytosanitary measures as a disguised bar-
rier to trade. Thus it is not enough for a Member Country to
say, "We think we have to impose these restrictions in order to
protect human, animal or plant life or health." The Member
Country in question has to make a proper objective assessment
of the risks to human, animal or plant life or health by taking
15. See Jochem Wiers, Regional and Global Approaches to Trade and Environment: The
EC and the WTO, 25 ISSUEs EUR. INTEGRATION 93, 98-100.
16. The express link with Article XX(b) is made in the last recital of the Agree-
ment on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO
Agreement, Annex 1, at www.wto.org/english/docs.e/legaLe/finale.htm ("SPS Agree-
ment").
17. SPS Agreement pmbl. at para. 1.
18. SPS Agreement pmbl. at para. 2.
19. SPS Agreement art. 5.1.
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into account risk assessment techniques developed by relevant
international organizations. This was the issue before the WTO
Panel requested by the United States and Canada in relation to
EU prohibitions on marketing or importing meat and meat
products from animals to which certain hormones had been ad-
ministered.
III. THE EU BAN ON BEEF HORMONES CASE
The Panel found that the EU ban on certain beef hormones
was not based on a risk assessment and so the EU had acted in-
consistently with the requirements of Article 5.1 of the SPS
Agreement. The Appellate Body upheld this basic finding, al-
though on more subtle grounds.2 0 It is these grounds that assist
us in assessing whether Article XX(b) provides adequate protec-
tion for Member Countries' concerns about the health and envi-
ronmental risks arising from new technologies.
The discussion before the Appellate Body turned on the
words "based on an assessment ... of the risks." There are two
important elements here: the notion of a risk assessment and
the meaning of the expression "based on."
Risk assessment is defined in paragraph 4 of Annex A to the
SPS Agreement as "the evaluation of the potential for adverse
effects on human or animal health arising from the presence of
additives, contaminants, toxins or disease-causing organisms in
food, beverages or feedstuffs."2 1 The Panel interpreted Article
5.1 as requiring the EU to ' assess the degree of risk, i.e., to quan-
tify the risk involved in use of the prohibited hormones.
The Appellate Body disagreed with this approach. It held
that there is no basis in the SPS Agreement for requiring a quan-
titative assessment. All that a panel can do is determine whether
a given measure is "based on" a risk assessment, that is to say,
that the measure is sufficiently supported or reasonably war-
ranted by the risk assessment. As for the factors to be taken into
account in the risk assessment, the Appellate Body upheld the
Panel's finding that this referred to a process characterized by
systematic, disciplined and objective enquiry and analysis.
The Appellate Body disagreed with the Panel, however, to
20. Two other findings of the Panel relating to Articles 5.5 and 3.1 of the SPS
Agreement, were reversed by the Appellate Body.
21. SPS Agreement app. A.
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the extent that the Panel purported to exclude from the scope
of a risk assessment all matters not susceptible of quantitative
analysis by the empirical or experimental laboratory methods
commonly associated with the physical sciences. As the Appel-
late Body rightly observed, some of the matters listed in Article
5.2, such as "relevant processes and production methods" and
"relevant inspection, sampling and testing methods," are not
necessarily or wholly susceptible of investigation according to
laboratory methods.2 2 Clearly the Appellate Body intended by
this to give the notion of risk assessment a wide interpretation as
it went on to say that the risk to be assessed extends to "risk in
human societies as they actually exist, in other words, the actual
potential for adverse effects on human health in the real world
where people live and work and die."23
We would argue that the expression "actual potential" has
to be read against the requirement that the measure be suffi-
ciently supported or reasonably warranted by the risk assess-
ment. In many cases one cannot say that there is "zero risk" and
so, in a sense, there is always "actual potential" for realization of
the risk. The leading UK tort case of Donoghue v. Stevenson
24
shows that there was, and presumably still is, a risk of snails turn-
ing up in ginger beer bottles, but it is not for this reason that
bottles of ginger beer are today prohibited from the market.
The chances of error can be minimized through stricter cleans-
ing requirements, good production practices, and selling ginger
beer in transparent bottles, but at the end of the day, there is still
a non-zero risk of a snail turning up in a ginger beer bottle. The
law deals with this residual acceptable risk through rules on
product liability of manufacturers, not by prohibiting the prod-
uct.
In relation to the question as to whether the EU measures
were "based on" a risk assessment, the Panel concluded that the
EU had not provided any evidence that the studies it referred to
or the scientific conclusions reached had actually been taken
22. "In the assessment of risks, Members shall take into account available scientific
evidence; relevant processes and production methods; relevant inspection, sampling
and testing methods; prevalence of specific diseases or pests; existence of pest- or dis-
ease-free areas; relevant ecological and environmental conditions; and quarantine or
other treatment." SPS Agreement art. 5.2.
23. Beef Hormones Case para. 187.
24. 1932 App. Cas. 562 (appeal taken from Scot.).
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into account. Consequently such studies and conclusions could
not be considered as constituting part of the risk assessment..
The Appellate Body disagreed with this procedural ap-
proach of the Panel. The Appellate Body felt that the legal test
was not whether the studies and conclusions had been taken
into account, because it is possible to take account of a study by
choosing to reject it. The Appellate Body said that the test had
to be whether there was an objective relationship between the
measure in question and the risk assessment that led to its adop-
tion. 25 On the facts of the case the Appellate Body came to the
conclusion that there was no rational relationship between the
EU prohibition on certain hormones in beef and a risk assess-
ment, and so upheld the Panel's finding on this point, although
on different grounds.
The substantive requirement of Article 5.1 of the SPS Agree-
ment is that there has to be a rational relationship between the
measure adopted and the risk assessment. The Appellate Body
recognized that the existence of diverging opinions in the scien-
tific community does not necessarily prevent a rational relation-
ship between the measure in question and the risk assessment,
especially where the risk involved is life-threatening in character
and is perceived to constitute a clear and imminent threat to
public health and safety. Thus the question of whether there is
such a rational relationship has to be determined on a case-by-
case basis "after account is taken of all considerations bearing
upon the issue of potential adverse health effects."
The Panel came to the conclusion that all the studies identi-
fied by the EU met the minimum requirements of a "risk assess-
ment" but that the conclusions of all these studies were that the
hormones in question were safe (other than the hormone MGA
for which no evidence was submitted). The Appellate Body
agreed that the studies did "not rationally support the EU im-
port prohibition '26 and that there was no risk assessment with
regard to the hormone MGA. 2 7
The EU also argued that while all the scientific evidence re-
lated to the risk of human ingestion hormone residue in treated
meat, there was also a distinguishable risk arising from the failure
25. See Beef Hormones Case para. 189.
26. Beef Hormones Case para. 197.
27. See Beef Hormones Case para. 201.
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to observe good veterinary practice, in combination with multi-
ple problems relating to detection and. control of such abusive
failure in the administration of hormones to cattle. The Panel
observed that the risk here was no different than the risk of abu-
sive use of veterinary drugs, which are allowed in the EU. More-
over, the EU had not produced evidence to show that control of
misuse of the hormones in question would be more difficult
under a regime that allowed their use under specific conditions
rather than a total ban. Thus, the Panel concluded that the ban-
ning of the hormones did not necessarily offer better protection
of human health than other means of regulating their use.
28
The Appellate Body agreed with the EU that it was allowed
to take into account the risk of failure to comply with good veter-
inary practice in the administration of the hormones in ques-
tion, as well as risks arising from difficulties of control, inspec-
tion, and enforcement of the requirements of good veterinary
practice.
The Appellate Body then examined whether the EU had in
fact submitted to the Panel a risk assessment demonstrating and
evaluating the existence and level of risk arising from abusive
use of hormones and the difficulties of control within the US
and Canada as exporting countries, and at the frontiers of the
EU as an importing country. On this particular point the Appel-
late Body agreed with the Panel that the EU had restricted itself
to pointing out the possibility of failure to comply with good
practice in the administration of hormones without providing an
assessment of the potential adverse effects related to non-compli-
ance with such practice. 9
For all these reasons the Appellate Body concluded that the
EU measures were not based on a risk assessment within the
meaning of Articles 5.1 and 5.2 of the SPS Agreement, and were
therefore inconsistent with the requirements of Article 5.1. The
Appellate Body's report was accepted by the Dispute Settlement
Body, and so the EU was bound to bring its hormone measures
into conformity with the SPS Agreement. For internal political
reasons the EU chose to maintain its hormone ban, and so Ca-
nada and the US asked for consultations. Since these consulta-
28. See Beef Hormones Case para. 203 (referring to U.S. Panel Report, para. 8.146
and Canada Panel Report, para. 8.149).
29. See Beef Hormones Case para. 207.
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tions did not result in any mutually agreeable solution, Canada
and the United States adopted countermeasures, and the EU
had recourse to arbitration in order to determine the appropri-
ate level of countermeasures.
Thus, rather than open its market to hormone-treated beef,
the EU chose to pay the price in terms of suspension of tariff
concessions by Canada and the United States. The EU con-
sumer can continue to consume beef with the assurance that it
has not been treated with hormones, that is assuming that he
can rely on the frontier, veterinary controls in relation to im-
ported beef and on the internal veterinary controls in relation to
beef produced within the EU.
IV. MAD COW DISEASE AND THE IMPORTANCE OF
EFFECTIVE INTERNAL HEALTH CONTROLS
Sadly, when the EU consumer now contemplates beef in the
supermarket, he is thinking more about BSE than hormones.
The outbreak of mad cow disease illustrates how the public
health issue is not one of preventing unbridled free trade but of
ensuring adequate controls within one's own domestic territory.
Here the cause for consumer concern arose within EU territory,
not outside. Once it was realized, belatedly, that there was a risk
from consuming beef produced within the United Kingdom, the
European Community adopted the necessary measures to en-
sure not only that UK beef could not circulate freely within the
other Member States, but also that it could not be exported to
third countries. 0
This ban was challenged in both the UK and the EU courts
and all the actions came before the European Court of Justice,
either as a direct challenge by the United Kingdom Govern-
ment, or as an indirect challenge, on a reference of a point of
EU law from the UK courts to the European Court of Justice.
3 1
The European Court of Justice had no difficulty in recognizing
that the ban on UK beef imposed by the EU had been adopted
validly under EU veterinary legislation. The ban was lifted when
subsequently the UK established the necessary controls to be
30. Commission Decision No. 96239/EEC, O.J. L 78, at 4 (1996).
31. See United Kingdom v. Commission, Case C-180/96, [1998] E.C.R. 1-2265; The
Queen v. Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, Commissioner of Customs and Excise, ex
parte National Farmers Union and others, Case C-157/96, [1998] E.C.R. 1-2211.
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able to assure consumers that all potentially infected beef had
been excluded from the food chain, although some Member
States, notably France, threatened not to accept the lifting of this
ban.
With tragic irony other EU Member States have discovered
that BSE infection is among their own beef herds. This brought
home to the European Commission the need to take stricter
control measures at an EU level and these have been duly
adopted by the EU Council upon a proposal from the Commis-
sion." The BSE case has shown that the problems of contamina-
tion can arise at home, which in turn, emphasizes the need for
effective controls in the domestic territory. Such controls need
to be exercised not just at the source (i.e., in the feeding of cat-
tle) but also in the supply to the consumer (e.g., at the slaughter-
ing stage).
In the case of imported beef from third countries both of
these stages can occur in a third country, and so it becomes very
difficult for the importing country to ensure that imported beef
is free of BSE unless it relies on controls exercised in the country
of export. If such controls are ineffective, and there is a real risk
of infection, the importing country is entitled, under the SPS
Agreement, to take measures to protect human health. The EU
would no doubt admit that, in extreme cases, such measures of
protection can extend to an import ban, because the EU itself
imposed an export ban on the UK at a time that it was not possi-
ble to be sure that UK beef was free from contamination.
V. BSE, GMOS-WHAT NEXT?
It is not surprising that after the discovery of the extent of
BSE contamination, consumers in the EU are very suspicious
about GMOs. To the uninformed, "genetic modification"
sounds much more dangerous than forcing cannibalism on bo-
vine animals. Frankenstein horrors spring to mind at the very
thought of tinkering with the genetic make-up of living orga-
nisms. The debate launched by new technologies is not limited
to genetically modified plants, but extends to cloning experi-
ments with animals and recent UK government policy to pro-
32. See, e.g., Commission Decision No. 2001/2/EEC, O.J. L 6/16 (2000); see also
the earlier measures referred to in the recitals to that decision. Other measures are in
the legislative pipeline.
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mote legislation to allow the use of human embryos for medical
applications. The public issue is not just one of food safety but
of the ethical approach we have to human, animal, and plant
life.
EU legislation on genetically modified plants provides a le-
gal testing ground for issues that will later arise for other new
products of biotechnology. From a strict legal point of view, Ar-
ticle XX applies in the same way to all products of new biotech-
nology, whether they be GMOs or products resulting from ge-
netic manipulation of animals or of human embryos, yet from an
ethical point of view, these cases will be seen by many as being
quite different. The different ethical considerations play a role
in determining what the legal position should be, but they do not
themselves constitute legal rules.
The genetic modification of plants, it should be observed, is
not like feeding bovine animals with feedstuffs made up from
bovine meat and bones. Natural cross-fertilization of plants is
continually producing new varieties. This process can be en-
couraged and controlled by so-called "natural" cross-fertilization
techniques. Modern biotechnology enables one to make 'the
step change in a more controlled fashion. In all cases it is neces-
sary to ensure that the new strain of plant is safe for human con-
sumption.
One may wonder how or why a different strain of, for exam-
ple, tomatoes, should not be safe for human consumption in the
same way as tomatoes are generally. The point is that the pro-
cess of genetic modification can create new proteins to which
some consumers might be allergic. It is therefore necessary to
ensure that the new plant product is safe for human consump-
tion, in the same way as one would proceed if tomorrow a new
exotic naturally occurring equatorial fruit was discovered.
Human safety is not the only concern. The creation of a
herbicide resistant variety of maize would a boon for farmers,
but if, cross-pollenization, the herbicide resistant characteristic
were transferred to thistles, that would be the farmer's scourge.
There is therefore a recognizable threat to the environment that
has to be managed when genetically modified organisms are cul-
tivated in the soil.
There is nothing novel about the two objectives just dis-
cussed: ensuring that food is safe for human consumption and
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ensuring that the biodiversity of the environment is not harmed.
All new inventions have good and bad uses. Modern history is
full of examples where man has had to manage the advantages
and disadvantages of new discoveries. The first steam carriages
had to be preceded by a man carrying a red flag whereas today's
motor cars hurtle along densely packed motorways at speeds
unimaginable by those first red flag carriers. People have free-
dom of choice, and certain communities choose to let techno-
logical progress pass them by. The point is that individual
choice as to a particular style of life is not a reason for stifling
free trade and the economic efficiencies that flow therefrom.
Thus we can conclude that there is no justified reason to
obstruct trade in GMOs provided the two objectives-protection
of human health and protection of the environment combined
with justified information for the public-can be achieved. This
is an objective scientific question. It will have to be recognized
that there will be occasions when things go wrong, just as in the
past there have been outbreaks of salmonella in eggs or pollu-
tion of agricultural plantations from lead emissions from car ex-
hausts. The way to avoid these mistakes is though vigilant non-
discriminatory domestic controls within the domestic territory,
not by preventing free trade. It is true that this approach does
not deal with the problems of damage caused to the environ-
ment outside the importing Member Country. This is a matter
that can only be solved through a new round of trade negotia-
tions.33
VI. EU LAW ON GENETICALLY MODIFIED ORGANISMS
In 1987 the EU Council adopted its Fourth Environmental
Action Programme,34 in which it recognized that the evaluation
and best use of biotechnology with respect to the environment
was a priority action on which the European Community should
33. See Hhctor Rogelio Torres, The Trade and Environment Interaction in the WrO-
How can a "New Round" Contribute? 33 J. WORLD TRADE 153 (1999); Matthew A. Cole,
Examining the Environmental Case Against Free Trade, 33 J. WORLD TRADE 183 (1999), ex-
amines the argument that free trade contributes to economic growth which in turn
leads to a reduction in pollutants. This argument, if valid, does not appear to apply in
the case of GMOs where the issue is not pollution by waste, but "pollution" by the end
product.
34. O.J. C 328, at 1 (1987). In fact, in 1987 it was the Council of the European
Communities which subsequently became, in 1994, the Council of the European
Union.
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concentrate. In relation to GMOs the Council subsequently
adopted Directive 90/219/EEC on the contained use of
GMOs,35 Directive 90/220/EEC on the deliberate release into
the environment of GMOs, 36 and Regulation (EC) No 258/97
on novel foods and novel food ingredients. For trade purposes
the only provisions of these measures that interest us are those of
Directive 90/220/EEC on the placing on the market of GMOs
and those in Regulation (EC) No 258/97 on the placing on the
market of foods and food ingredients containing, or consisting
of, GMOs or produced from, but not containing, GMOs.
A. Placing of GMOs on the Market
The procedure for authorization to place a GMO on the EU
market is complex because it is designed to allow Member States
to play their individual roles, while ensuring that the end result
is a common EU approach. The procedure begins with an appli-
cation made to a Member State authority. Such application
must contain a risk analysis similar to that required for a release
into the environment, 8 the conditions for the placing of the
GMO on the market (which must comply with the relevant EU
product legislation), and an environmental risk assessment.
Upon receipt of a complete application, the concerned
Member State authority has ninety days in which either to reject
the application for non-compliance with Directive 90/220/EEC,
or to forward the application to the European Commission with
a favourable opinion. The Commission then forwards copies of
the file to all the other Member States. The other Member
States have sixty days in which to raise objections. In the absence
of any objections within the sixty days, the notifying Member
State must issue its consent to the placing of the GMO on the
market and must notify the Commission and all the other Mem-
ber States. As a result of such notification, the GMO may be
used without further notification throughout the EU in so far as
the specific conditions of use and the environments and/or geo-
graphical areas stipulated in these conditions are strictly ad-
35. Council Directive No. 90/219/EEC, OJ. L 117, at 1 (1990).
36. Id. OJ. L 117, at 15 (1990).
37. Council Regulation No. 258/97, OJ. L 43, at 1 (1997). This directive was
adopted by the EU Council jointly with the European Parliament.
38. For a controlled release into the environment for the purposes of field trials,
see Council Directive No. 90/220, OJ. L 117/8, at 15 (1990).
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Where a Member State raises an objection in sixty day pe-
riod, the application is subjected to what is known in the EU as a
"comitology procedure." The details of this procedure need not
be explained here. Suffice it to observe that the Commission
can propose and adopt a solution after consulting a committee
of Member State representatives, unless the Member States vote
unanimously in favour of a different solution or in favour of no
action at all. The point about the "comitology procedure" is that
it introduces an element of unpredictability in the EU decision-
making process, which is sometimes difficult for third countries
to understand.
B. Placing on the Market Foods or Food Ingredients Containing or
Consisting of GMOs, or Food or Food Ingredients Produced From but
not Containing GMOs
The placing on the market of foods or food ingredients con-
taining or consisting of GMOs is governed by Regulation (EC)
No 258/97, referred to above. The authorization procedure is
similar, but not identical, to that under Directive 90/220/EEC.
This procedure applies also to the placing on the market of
foods or food ingredients produced from, but not containing,
GMOs.
Such products would include, for example, maize flour pro-
duced from genetically modified maize. Such products are no
longer organisms capable of reproducing themselves and so the
risk assessment concentrates more on the food safety aspects
than on the environmental risks. There is also a simplified au-
thorization procedure for food or food ingredients produced
from but not containing GMOs.4 °
Where it can be shown that the novel food or food ingredi-
ent is substantially equivalent to an existing food or food ingredi-
ent in regard to composition, nutritional value, metabolism, in-
tended use, and the level of undesirable substances contained
therein, the applicant may simply notify the Commission that it
is placing the product on the market. Such notification must be
accompanied with the documentary proof that the food or food
ingredient is substantially equivalent to an existing food or food
39. Council Directive No. 90/220, art. 13(5), O.J. L 117/8/5 (1990).
40. Commission Regulation No. 258/97, art. 3(4), O.J. L 043 (1997).
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ingredient. Such proof may consist of generally recognized sci-
entific evidence, or an opinion of the competent food authority
of a Member State. In practice, a company making such notifica-
tion will seek an opinion from the food authority of a Member
State and that authority will base its opinion on generally recog-
nized scientific evidence.
C. Member States' Concerns About EU GMO Legislation
Member States are concerned about the potential risks to
human health and to biodiversity from the placing on the mar-
ket of GMOs and food products derived from GMOs. In addi-
tion, there is the political issue of transparency and freedom of
choice for consumers. As a result, a de facto moratorium has
been applied by the Member States with the result that no new
approvals have been granted under Directive 90/220/EEC or
Regulation (EC) No. 258/97 since October 1998. Moreover, sev-
eral Member States have already taken safeguard measures
against specific approved GM products. An additional problem
arises under Regulation (EC) No. 258/97 in that some Member
States consider that the simplified procedure for the approval of
GMO-derived foods and food ingredients does not give all Mem-
ber States an adequate say in the approval procedure.
As a result of these concerns, the Commission proposed an
amendment to Directive 90/220/EEC. The EU Council and the
European Parliament finally came to agreement on December
22, 2000, on the text of the required amendments to Directive
90/220/EEC. The amendments provide for improved informa-
tion to the public at the time of field trials, for a tightening of
the approval procedure and for a widening of the scope of the
safeguard clause. Member States will be allowed to take safe-
guard action where they have "additional" information, as op-
posed to the current requirement of "new" information on the
basis of which there is a risk to human health or the environ-
ment. In addition, the Commission has undertaken to bring for-
ward its proposal for implementation of the Cartagena Protocol
on Biosafety4 and to submit to the Council and to the Parlia-
41. Although potential conflicts of this Protocol with GATT 1994 will bring their
own set of problems. For a review of these conflicts, see Peter W.B. Phillips and William
A. Kerr, Alternative Paradigms: The WTO versus the Biosafety Protocol for Trade in Genetically
Modified Organisms, 34J. WORLD TRADE 63 (2000).
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ment a proposed directive on the labeling and tractability of
GMOs. It remains to be seen whether all this will have the effect
of unblocking the Member States' de facto moratorium on new
approvals under Directive 90/220/EEC. Moreover, the simpli-
fied authorization procedure under Regulation (EC) No 258/97
for GMO derived foods remains a source of discontent. Respect
for the rule of law is ultimately going to lie with the EU and
national courts.
Directive 90/220/EEC and Regulation (EC) No 258/97
contain a safeguard clause,42 which the Member States have not
hesitated to invoke in order to ban EU-approved GMO products
in their national territory and thereby put political pressure on
the Commission to hasten amendments to EU GMO legislation.
So far there has been no court judgment on the legality of the
Member States' use of the safeguard clause.
Some judicial guidance is available, however, from a recent
decision of the European Court of Justice upon a referral of a
preliminary question of law from the French Conseil d'Etat.
The European Court of Justice rendered a subtle ruling43 in
which it recognized the duty of a Member State to be concerned
about new information that might cast doubts on a Commission
decision authorizing the placing of a GMO on the market. In
such a case the Court ruled that the Member State in question
should suspend any implementation of the Commission's deci-
sion, but should immediately invoke the safeguard clause and
notify the Commission and the other Member States. The Court
also recalled its earlier case-law44 according to which only the
Court of Justice has jurisdiction to rule on the invalidity of a
measure adopted by an EU institution, such as a measure au-
thorizing the placing of a GMO on the market. The Court did
not give any guidance as to what sort of irregularities at the na-
tional level might lead to invalidity at the EU level nor did it rule
on what would or would not constitute new information justify-
ing the use of the safeguard clause.45
42. Council Directive No. 90/220, art. 16, O.J. L 117/8/5 (1990); Commission
Regulation No. 258/97, art. 12, O.J. L 043 (1997).
43. Association Greenpeace France et al. v. Ministre de l'Agriculture et de la Peche et al,
Case C-6/99, (ECJ Mar. 21, 2000) (not yet reported).
44. Foto-frost v HZ Laibeck-Ost, Case 314/85, [1987] E.C.R. 4199.
45. It is not surprising that the Court ofJustice, with its very busy timetable, did not
seek to rule on theoretical considerations. For a criticism of the failure to give any
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This latter question is currently before at least one national
court. It is, therefore, an unanswered question whether the Eu-
ropean Court of Justice will allow the Member States a wide or a
narrow interpretation of the safeguard clause in GMO matters.
Whatever the Court of Justice decides in this matter, it will have
to ensure that its ruling does not place the Community in a situa-
tion where it would be in breach of its WTO/GATT obligations.
VII. DO PARAGRAPHS (B) AND (G) OF ARTICLE XX GIVE THE
EU ADEQUATE PROTECTION?
We come now to the question whether Article XX provides
the EU with adequate protection for its consumer protection
and environmental concerns in the biotechnology area.
In the Shrimp/Turtle dispute the Appellate Body held that
the sea turtle was "an exhaustible natural resource" within the
meaning of Article XX(g) (although, as observed above, the US
measures were found to be arbitrary and discriminatory and
therefore incompatible with GATT 1994 obligations). How does
trade in GMOs threaten exhaustible natural resources? Argua-
bly, the release of GMOs into the environment could result in
gradual cross-fertilization with all known plant varieties in their
present form. If it is accepted that the non-genetically modified
variety is a different "resource" than the non-modified variety,
then it is possible that introduction of a genetically modified va-
riety into the environment would endanger the survival of the
non-modified "resource." Logically this question should be re-
solved using the same approach as already used in the introduc-
tion of new (unmodified) hybrids. It could also be said that the
introduction of a new variety could endanger the life or health
of existing species within the meaning of Article XX(b). This is
true, but again, it is a consideration that is already applied under
phytosanitary legislation and so would fall to be dealt with under
the SPS Agreement. From the point of view of protection of
plant life and health there is no ground for over-reacting to
trade in GMOs: their introduction into the environment should
be approached in the same way as the introduction of new plant
species obtained by hybrid techniques.
As far as concerns the health and life of consumers, the nor-
guidelines, see Andrea Mastromatteo, A Lost Opportunity for European Regulation of Geneti-
cally Modified Organisms, 25 EUR. L. REv. 425 (2000).
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mal procedures for protecting human health can be applied
within the limits defined by the SPS Agreement. As has already
been argued, the question is not one of banning food products
in which consumers have no confidence for one reason or an-
other, but in ensuring objectively that the public will be safe.
However rigorous the public food safety checks, there will occa-
sionally be cases where unsafe food enters the food chain, for
the simple reason that human beings are fallible. The more
dangerous the product, the more rigorous should be the efforts
taken to prevent it entering the food chain. Given that GMOs
are now in the environment, traces of them will turn up in the
food chain from time to time, even where the production chain
has been managed so as to be GMO free.4 6 It is rather like lead,
cadmium, and many synthetic fertilizers. Traces of them turn up
inevitably in the food chain.4 7 No one has sought to ban imports
because they contain traces of lead, and yet there is no reason to
suppose that traces of lead are less dangerous than traces of
GMO.
It has to be concluded that there is no valid reason for sin-
gling out GMOs for treatment in any manner different from the
way questions of authorized food additives have been dealt with
since the beginnings of the GATT. One country may authorize
the use of a particular additive and another may prohibit the use
of this additive but authorize another. The normal procedures
for recognition of products in the WTO apply here, based on
objective scientific evidence.
VIII. THE "ETHICAL" OBJECTION
By ethical here we mean a value judgment made by an indi-
vidual or even by the public as a whole, as to whether use of a
certain sort of product is a good action or a bad action. Such a
consideration does not fall within Article XX(a) on the protec-
tion of public morals. The' objective of this provision is to allow
Member Countries to ensure that vulnerable sections of the pop-
46. An example is the recent case of traces of unauthorised GMO derived products
turning up in tortillas on the shelves of UK supermarkets, even though the products
had been produced in a theoretically GMO-free environment.
47. An illustration of this can be found in the judgment of the European Court of
Justice concerning the question whether jam could be described as "natural" if it con-
tained traces of lead, cadmium and pesticides. See Case C-465/98, Verein gegen Unwesen
in Handel und Gewerbe Kaln eV v Adolf Darbo AG, 2000 E.C.R. 4.
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ulation are not morally depraved through exposure, for exam-
ple, to pornographic material. No one would seriously suggest
that sections of the population would be morally depraved
through eating GMOs or GMO derived food. The only ethical
consideration here is that consumers should be allowed to
choose what they eat.
Traditional regulations on labeling as to ingredients already
meet this objective and are compatible with WTO/GATT obliga-
tions provided the labeling requirements are not discriminatory
and are not so disproportionate as to amount to a barrier to
trade. For example, a labeling requirement that the list of ingre-
dients should also show the name and address of the supplier of
each of those ingredients would be disproportionate because it
would serve no useful purpose in furthering the protection of
human health. By analogy, one could pose the question, "is the
requirement that a distinction be made between ingredients
containing GMOs or derived from GMOs and other ingredients
disproportionate once it is established that there is no health
risk from consuming the ingredients containing or derived from
GMOs?" Logically, if there is absolutely no health risk, such a
labeling requirement would not be justified since, like the infor-
mation about the suppliers of all the ingredients, it does not
serve any useful purpose. It is here, perhaps, that our regulators
are guilty of a kind of "double-think." "There is no health risk,
but just in case there is a risk, we Will require that the product be
labelled so that you can choose for yourself."48 For the time be-
ing, at least, this double-think is generally accepted as a legiti-
mate approach. In WTO/GATT terms, such labelling require-
ments must be non-discriminatory and must not have the effect
of rendering it more difficult for exporters than for domestic
producers to market products.
The issue then is whether a Member Country can impose a
negative labeling or a positive labeling obligation. A negative
labeling obligation is the obligation to label a product "GMO
48. C. Ford Runge & Lee Ann Jackson, Labelling, Trade and Genetically Modified Or-
ganisms-A Proposed Solution, 34J. WORLD TRADE 111, 119 (2000), are more candid, and
affirm that "there is a legitimate need to conduct monitoring and research to assure the
safety of GMO foods, notwithstanding claims to the contrary." See also Fiona MacMillan
& Michael Blakeney, Regulating CMOs: Is the WTO Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary
Measures Hormonally Challenged? 2 I.T.L.R. 161, 167 (2000) (discussing the interface be-
tween science and regulation).
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free" if one wants to target that section of the market desirous of
eating GMO free products. Negative labeling is therefore an op-
tional system of labeling. The problem is that voluntary use of
negative labeling could mislead consumers into believing that
products containing or derived from GMOs are less safe, thereby
creating a barrier to trade, unless the label was accompanied by
a statement such as "no significant difference has yet been
shown between foods with and without GMOs."49 A positive la-
beling obligation is the obligation to label a product "Contains
GMOs" or "Derived from GMOs" when the product contains or
is derived from GMOs. Where positive labeling obligations are
imposed without any exceptions for adventitious presence, 50 pro-
ducers who do not operate in a hermetically closed environment
are practically obliged to label everything "may contain GMOs or
GMO derived material." Once this occurs, the positive label is
totally devalued.
The ethical consideration in relation to GMOs in food is
simply that producers should not be allowed to give novel foods
to consumers without telling them that the foods contain or are
derived from GMOs. There is no vociferous section of the popu-
lation that affirms that it is unethical to modify plants geneti-
cally. Some animal lovers might be more vociferous in ob-
jecting, on ethical or moral grounds, to genetic engineering in
animals, and others51 object very strongly to the prospect of
products obtained through research carried out on human em-
bryos.
It is beyond the scope of this Essay to argue the ethical or
moral case against genetic engineering in animals or research
on human embryos. Whatever the point of view of the reader, it
should be possible to understand that there are some activities
and practices that are seen by certain segments of the popula-
tion not just as unethical, but as morally wrong. At this level,
labeling does not solve the problem. The consumer considers
that it is wrong that products should be manufactured in a cer-
tain way. That is a political reality that regulators will have to
take account of in the near future, and in taking account of it
49. See id.
50. I.e., the presence of GMOs in food or food ingredients, even where operators
have taken appropriate steps to avoid using GMOs or products derived therefrom.
51. Of which the author is one.
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they are inevitably going to find that Article XX of the GATT
1994, in its present formulation, does not provide them with any
defence.
CONCLUSION
It is understandable why environmental and consumer pro-
tection groups think that free trade in accordance with GATT
1994 rules constitutes a serious danger to the environment and
to consumers. The proponents of free trade, on the other hand,
have valid reasons to fear that environmental and consumer pro-
tection regulations very soon become disguised obstacles to free
trade. It is not that they support free trade to the detriment of
all other considerations, but that they believe that through free
trade all the world's trading nations will develop economically
and will have greater resources to deal with environmental
problems, problems that ultimately have to be handled globally
through multilateral conventions. As far as consumer protection
is concerned, it is not that the free traders want to expose the
consumer to unnecessary risk, but that measures to protect pub-
lic health must be based on objective scientific evidence. Na-
tional politicians can make errors of judgment in the handling
of threats to food safety, as the mad cow case has shown. Argua-
bly the consumer has a greater interest in seeing his food safety
interests ruled by international organizations such as the WHO,
under the watchful surveillance of the WTO, than by the com-
plexities of national politics.
In the polyvalent society of the Global Market Place there is,
of course, small room for individual ethics. Ethics are not a per-
mitted ground for restricting trade pursuant to Article XX of
GATT 1994. The reason for this is simply the potential for
abuse. Member countries who wish to meet ethical concerns of
sections of their populations may achieve this through non-dis-
criminatory proportionate labeling requirements. In the GMO
field, meaningful and truthful labeling should meet consumer
concerns in relation to consumption of food containing or de-
rived from GMOs. On the other hand, it is predicted that label-
ing cannot meet the more serious ethical concerns of sections of
the population arising out of new technologies involving genetic
modification of animals or manipulation of human embryos.
We conclude that, in its present form, Article XX provides the
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necessary safeguards for the local environment and for human
health in relation to GMOs; the burden lies on importing Mem-
ber Countries to ensure that non-discriminatory, proportionate
and effective action is taken to protect the consumer and the
local environment. The "external," or international environ-
ment is a matter for multinational agreement, not domestic reg-
ulation. On the other hand, Article XX provides no comfort to
the ethical and moral questions posed by other technologies
such as genetic engineering in animals and research carried out
on the human embryo.
